http://nautilus.org/apsnet/abu-sayyaf-and-us-and-australian-military-intervention-in-the-southern-philippines/
Introduction
Carolin Liss of Murdoch University writes that under a new Status
of Forces Agreement “Australia will only be the second country to be allowed to
send substantial numbers of military personnel to the Philippines”. US forces
operate alongside Philippines government forces (AFP) targeting the Islamic
insurgency in the southern Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf in particular. However,
AFP operations “have led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of
people. These operations have therefore contributed to the suffering of the
local population and have undoubtedly increased local support for groups such
as the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf”. Liss concludes that “insufficient economic and
humanitarian assistance and the continuous use of military force to ‘pacify’
and integrate the south into the main body of the Philippine nation-state, is
unlikely to succeed”.
The southern Philippines regions of Sulu and Mindanao, have given
rise to three major Islamic-based insurgent organisations, of which the most
radical today is the Abu Sayyaf. Successive Philippines governments have
responded with force, and occasional bouts of negotiations. This article
provides an overview of the violent history of the Abu Sayyaf and examines the
increasing involvement of foreign forces, namely US and possibly Australian
troops, in the conflict between the Philippine government and Muslim
insurgents. The paper questions the success of the involvement of foreign
military forces, suggesting that it may in fact aggravate an already volatile
situation.
Forerunners of the Abu Sayyaf
When the Spanish colonial forces arrived in the sixteenth century
in the archipelago that is today known as the Philippines, they referred to
their enemies, the various Islamised groups in the south, collectively, as
‘Moros’. The term carried connotations of backwardness and inferiority and
became synonymous with savagery, barbarism, piracy and the like. When the
American colonial forces attempted to impose their sovereignty on Mindanao and
Sulu in 1898, they also met staunch opposition from Muslim people in the
southern part of the Philippine archipelago. The conflict between the American
forces and the Muslim population led to the emergence of the notion of the
so-called `Moro Problem´, a social and political concept which became an
integral part of American colonial vocabulary and policy in the southern
Philippines. The term ‘Moro’ still has a wide currency in the Mindanao-Sulu
region, but with a significantly different connotation. Since the late 1960s a
deepening Islamic consciousness and an increased unity among Muslim Filipinos,
in the face of the politics of integration in the Philippines, has led some
Philippine Muslim nationalists to refer to themselves collectively as Bangsa
Moro (‘the Muslim people’). In this usage the term ‘Moro’ has thus been
transformed into a positive symbol of collective identity.
In the early 1970s, broad-based separatist movements began to
emerge in the southern Philippines as a result of the political, social and
economic marginalisation of the Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu. As
Muslims in a Christian-dominated state, Islam has been an important
ideological-cultural aspect of the separatist struggle in this area.[1]
Increased globalisation, and its associated rapid exchange of money, goods and
ideas, including the dissemination of radical ideologies and political tactics,
as well as the increased travel of Muslims between the Middle East and the
southern Philippines, also played a pivotal role.[2]
The first major group to emerge in 1971 in the southern Philippine was the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Nur Misuari. The initial aim of this
group was to establish a separate Moro homeland with “a democratic system of
government which [does] not allow or tolerate any form of exploitation and
oppression of any human being by another or of one nation by another”,[3]
and the preservation of Islamic and indigenous culture.[4]
However, internal fighting divided the group from the outset and over the years
a number of factions split from the MNLF. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), identified with the Islamic scholar Hashim Salamat, separated from the
MNLF in 1984, stressing the ideological importance of Islamic renewal as part
of the struggle for Muslim self-determination.[5]
Like separatist movements in other parts of the world, the MILF
and MNLF chose armed struggle to further their aims. Successive Philippine
governments answered in kind, with some presidents using extreme forms of
violence, including the use of napalm, against the local population in the south.[6]
Over the years the ongoing conflict between these groups and the successive
Philippine governments resulted in considerable destruction of villages and
towns in the area and the displacement of the local population, including
Christians, Muslims and Bajaus.
Guerrilla warfare was the predominant pattern of armed struggle
used by the MNLF and the MILF, with troops of both groups controlling parts of
the countryside and establishing fixed bases in the southern Philippines.
However, in both organisations individual leaders and their idiosyncratic
tactics caused problems. Rogue elements within both the MNLF and MILF were
accused of being responsible for kidnappings, extortion and robberies in the
Philippines and occasional pirate attacks off the country’s coast.[7]
Since the 1970s, attempts have been made by the MNLF, MILF and the
Philippine government to end the conflict in the south. In 1996, after decades
of negotiations, the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government.
However, due to corruption within the MNLF and, perhaps more importantly,
because the government did not keep its promises regarding economic assistance
and the fact that numerous former MNLF fighters were left without employment,
unrest persisted.[8]
In fact, many dissatisfied MNLF members defected to the MILF, particularly
after 1996, due to their frustration over the outcome of the agreement.
Therefore, by 1996 (if not earlier) the MILF became the most powerful insurgent
movement in the southern Philippines. The Philippine government had recognised
the importance and influence of the MILF early on and in 1992 began
negotiations. However, while a number of agreements between the government and
the MILF were reached over the years and a cease-fire signed in 2001, the
situation remains volatile and negotiations are still ongoing.[9]
Dissatisfaction with the MILF and MNLF and the failure of the
Philippine government to either solve the Mindanao-Sulu problem politically, or
truly abide by the tenets of the various peace agreements reached with the MNLF
and MILF, enhanced the radicalisation of some young Muslims. This radicalising
process and political frustration on the part of Muslim youth was demonstrated
by the emergence and rise of the extremely militant group, Abu
Sayyaf.
The Abu Sayyaf
The Abu Sayyaf was founded in the early 1990s by a former MNLF
member Abdurajak Janjalani. A charismatic leader and an eloquent speaker,
Janjalani was also a committed Muslim scholar who had studied, among other
places, in Mecca and Libya. After his return to the Philippines from the Middle
East, Janjalani broke with the MNLF, as he, unlike the MNLF leadership,
remained committed to the notion of jihad for an independent Islamic
state, and founded his own organisation – the Abu Sayyaf.[10]
Since the early 1990s the Abu Sayyaf is believed to be responsible
for a spate of attacks and robberies in the southern Philippines, including
bombings, extortion, raids of villages, attacks on military posts and
kidnappings. The military blamed the Abu Sayyaf for committing 102 terrorist
acts between 1991 and 1995 alone, and claimed it amassed 20 million Pesos
through kidnapping in that period.[11]
The government reacted in force against the Abu Sayyaf. By the mid-1990s,
sporadic battles between the Abu Sayyaf and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) were severely affecting the civilian population on the island of Basilan,
the stronghold of the Abu Sayyaf,[12]
as well as on surrounding islands, resulting in the displacement of thousands
of people in the area.[13]
In 1998, Abdurajak Janjalani was killed in a gun battle with the
police and the organizational and ideological structure of the Abu Sayyaf
changed. After considerable internal struggle, Abdurajak Janjalani was
succeeded by his brother Khaddafy Janjalani, who lacked the ideological and
religious moorings of Abdurajak.[14]
Not all commanders and fighters of the Abu Sayyaf accepted Khaddafy as their
new leader, and the group developed into an even more radical movement
consisting of several loosely connected factions, without a clear set of
doctrines and principles.[15]
However, even before Abdurajak Janjalani’s death, the Philippine
government repeatedly characterised the Abu Sayyaf as a group of bandits with
no political agenda, profiting from the general state of lawlessness on the
edge of the frontier in the southern Philippines. Indeed, it often appears
difficult to draw a clear line dividing political aims from criminal purposes
in regard to the Abu Sayyaf. There is no doubt that kidnapping and ransom have
played an important part in the group’s strategy and tactics. Yet the group’s
basic aim was clearly defined as the establishment of an independent Islamic
state in the southern Philippines. Judging by demands made during kidnapping
incidents throughout the 1990s, other, perhaps more realistic aims, were also
of critical importance to the group. These included the exclusion of undesirable
foreign influences, such as Christian missionaries, from the southern
Philippines, the banning of foreign fishing boats and fishermen from the waters
of the Sulu and Celebes seas, and the teaching of Islam in Philippine schools.[16]
These demands indicate that the group is not just ‘in it for the money’ but has
been fighting for fundamental political and economic objectives and changes.
More difficult, though, is determining whether the group is
primarily religiously or politically motivated. During Abdurajak Janjalani´s
leadership, Abu Sayyaf members and the group’s aims were heavily influenced by
Janjalani´s teachings and his interpretation of jihad. However, the
group’s emergence out of the backwater of historical-political neglect of the
Muslim population in the southern Philippines, as well as
economic-environmental demands such as the banning of foreign fishermen,
indicate that the Abu Sayyaf´s agenda was first and foremost political in
nature, even under Janjalani´s leadership. After Khaddafy took over the reins
of leadership in 1999, the group lost some of its Islamic ideological base, and
political aims became even more explicit and prominent. Nonetheless, Islam and
the plight of the regional Muslim populace remained an important part of Abu
Sayyaf ideology.[17]
A Change of tactics – Operations across borders
Until April 2000 the Abu Sayyaf had confined its operations to the
southern Philippines. The audacious kidnapping of 21 international tourists and
resort workers from the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan therefore marked a
new phase in Abu Sayyaf operations and strategy.
The kidnapping occurred at a time of unrest in the southern
Philippines. President Estrada had addressed the problems in the southern part
of the country primarily with military force, thus intensifying the armed
conflict. Despite peace-talks in late 1999, the conflict between the AFP and
the MILF escalated in early 2000, resulting in a full-scale war in the south.[18]
While the AFP offensive against the MILF was in progress, the on-going conflict
between the Abu Sayyaf and the military on Basilan also intensified. On March
20, an Abu Sayyaf group, headed by Khaddafy Janjalani, attacked an army outpost
on Basilan. As the attack failed, fleeing Abu Sayyaf members seized more than
50 hostages from two nearby schools for use as human shields. Many of the
schoolchildren abducted were released shortly after their capture, but the
group held on to about 30 hostages, among them a parish priest and 17
schoolchildren. Following this wholesale abduction, the Abu Sayyaf began
issuing demands for such basic supplies as rice and blankets and requested that
the movie actor and Muslim convert Robert Padilla be sent as a negotiator.
Padilla, visiting the Abu Sayyaf camp, persuaded the group to release two of
the children, but the conflict intensified once again when a Christian vigilante
group kidnapped eleven members of Khaddafy Janjalani´s family, including his
mother, his one-year old daughter and his pregnant wife. Although Khaddafy’s
wife and daughter were released soon after in exchange for hostages held by the
Abu Sayyaf,[19]
the group and the military remained locked in a standoff. Under tremendous
pressure, the Abu Sayyaf published a new set of demands with an international
appeal, calling for the release of Ramzi Yousef, the alleged World Trade Center
bomber and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, convicted of masterminding terrorist
attacks, both imprisoned in the United States. The group further demanded all
Christian crosses be removed on Basilan, the banning of foreign trawlers from
the island’s fishing grounds, and the teaching of Islam in public schools to be
adopted across the southern Philippines.[20]
On April 19, the Abu Sayyaf announced they had beheaded two teachers as a
‘birthday gift’ to Estrada, who turned 63 that day, and warned that other
hostages would also die unless the government rapidly initiated steps towards
meeting their political demands. Disregarding this threat, Estrada refused to
negotiate with the Abu Sayyaf and launched an all-out assault on Janjalani´s
hideout on April 22, sending in government troops, helicopters, and bombers.[21]
The following day, another faction of the Abu Sayyaf, based on the island of
Jolo, kidnapped 21 international tourists and resort employees from a Malaysian
holiday resort on Sipadan Island.
In the course of this daring event, members of an Abu Sayyaf
faction led by Ghalib Andang (alias Commander Robot) raided a diving resort on
the island of Sipadan and escaped with 21 hostages, among them two South
Africans, a Lebanese, two Finns, a French couple, and three members of a German
family. They were taken to the southern Philippine island of Jolo, where they
were held captive for several months while political and financial demands for
their freedom were negotiated. The kidnapping was an ordeal for all the
hostages. They had to move from camp to camp on the island to evade attacks by
the AFP and adapt to life in the jungle of Jolo. However, the Abu Sayyaf also
allowed visitors to enter the camp. This included their own relatives, other
Abu Sayyaf members, interested locals, vendors selling food and other goods to
the hostages, a Christian sect called the ‘Jesus Miracle Crusaders’ who came to
pray with the hostages for their release, as well as representatives of the
local and international media. Indeed, throughout the next month, 20 television
crews, 24 photographers and countless journalists from all around the world,
but primarily from the hostages’ home countries, visited to report ‘live from
the hostage camp’.[22]
Through the regular visits of journalists and the subsequent media coverage,
the identity and fate of the hostages became known around the world. However,
the visits of the media in the hostage camp also caused problems, as
journalists were themselves kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf members or factions and
other rogue groups while visiting the hostage camps.[23]
Meanwhile, the negotiations for the hostages’ release were
ongoing, with the media coverage putting additional pressure on the Philippine
government to ensure the safe release of the captives. The initial demands of
the kidnappers were reportedly political in nature and included the establishment
of an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines and the
establishment of a human rights commission to investigate human rights abuses
against Muslim Filipinos in Sabah.[24]
However, the Sipadan hostages were eventually released in small groups after
the kidnappers accepted substantial ransoms and the promise of major
developmental projects to be implemented in the Sulu-Mindanao region. With
estimates regarding the ransom paid for the hostages varying between US$15 to
US$25 million,[25]
the kidnapping was undoubtedly highly successful for the Abu Sayyaf. While the
group did not accomplish their principal political goals, their demands have
(at least to some extent) been discussed in many parts of the world, and an
extraordinarily large amount of ransom money was paid, leaving the group with
necessary funds to buy more equipment and recruit new members. In order to
‘crush’ the now strengthened group, the government’s military offensive against
the Abu Sayyaf continued unrestrained in the wake of the Sipadan kidnapping.
However, on May 27, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf abducted yet another 20 people,
including three Americans, from a holiday resort on the island of Palawan in
the western Philippines. Announcing that she had no intention of suffering the
humiliation experienced by her predecessor Joseph Estrada in dealing with the
terrorist group, President Arroyo immediately ruled out both negotiations and
ransoms, and warned the kidnappers to free their hostages unconditionally and surrender
or ‘die in a hail of bullets’.[26]
However, a ransom was eventually paid to free the US hostages, but the money
did not reach the Abu Sayyaf faction holding the hostages. After the failed
ransom attempt, the AFP, acting on US intelligence, attacked the hostage camp
in June 2002. Two hostages, among them one American captive, were killed, while
the other US hostage was freed.[27]
Despite government pressure, the Abu Sayyaf continued to conduct
attacks. However, after this spate of kidnappings, the group began to
concentrate more on bomb attacks in cities and at sea. Among the most
devastating acts committed by the group in recent years was the bombing of the SuperFerry
14 in February 2004, in which more than 100 people lost their lives. On
this occasion, an Abu Sayyaf member brought a package with a TV filled with
explosives onboard the ferry sailing from Manila to Bacolod and Davao. The
perpetrator placed the bomb in the cheapest and busiest passenger section and
left the boat before it cast off. An hour after its departure, the bomb,
triggered by a timing device, exploded and started a fire that engulfed the
ship.[28]
The aftermath of 9/11 and the involvement of the US and Australia
Since 9/11, the nature of the conflict in the southern Philippines
has changed. After the attack, President Arroyo offered full support for the
international coalition against terrorism and linked the international efforts
to combat terrorism to the struggle against the Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist
groups in the Philippines.[29]
In return, the Philippine government received financial and moral support from
the US to fight against terrorism in general and the Abu Sayyaf in particular.
US interest in addressing the Abu Sayyaf threat was strengthened by the
kidnapping of US nationals and alleged links between the group and al-Qaeda.
The Abu Sayyaf is believed to have received funding and support from al-Qaeda
in the early 1990s. However, the link weakened after 1995, resulting in a
shortage of funds for the Abu Sayyaf, with the group resorting to kidnapping
for ransom. There are different assessments regarding the strength of the
current links between the Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda. While some observers suggest
that the connections between the two groups are weak, others, among them
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, believe that the ties between
the two groups have been substantially strengthened after 9/11, and that the
Abu Sayyaf has been receiving training, arms and other support in recent years.
Also of interest to the US is that the Abu Sayyaf is cooperating with other
radical groups and individuals, such as radical members of the MILF and the
Indonesian based terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is also believed
to have links to al-Qaeda. Members of JI have been found in the southern
Philippines. Abu Sayyaf, JI and MILF members have conducted joint operations,
including bombings.[30]
Furthermore, camps have been established in the southern Philippines where
militants from various Southeast Asian groups have received training, with the
number of people trained there now believed to equal the number of militants
trained in Afghanistan.[31]
All these factors strengthened US interest in combating the Abu
Sayyaf and led to increased deployment of US military personnel to the southern
Philippines to assist the AFP in its campaign against the Abu Sayyaf. This
cooperation between the US and the Philippines is conducted under the two countries’
Visiting Forces Agreement signed in 1998. As early as 2002, 1,300 US
military personnel supported the AFP in the Abu Sayyaf stronghold of Basilan as
part of Operation Balikatan. The role of the US was restricted to non-combat
operations, despite offers from the US of more direct involvement. President
Arroyo, was forced to decline this offer due to widespread criticism and
concern voiced by local politicians, the media and various NGOs.[32]
After the US supported operations in Basilan ended in 2002, US
military assistance to the Philippines continued. In 2005, for example, two
major operations involving US military personnel commenced and still continue
today. Both operations target the Abu Sayyaf, with the first focusing on
western Mindanao, and the second on the island of Jolo, a further stronghold of
the group. US support in western Mindanao reportedly included intelligence and
communication assistance for the AFP and the “deployment of Navy Seal and
Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units”.[33]
In Jolo, US personnel assisted the AFP in mine clearing. Additionally, in
February and March 2006, a joint Philippine-US military exercise was held in
the Sulu islands. The exercise involved 5,500 US military personnel, 250 of
which participated in non-combat exercises on the island concentrating on civic
action projects such as medical services. After the exercise, the US troops did
not leave the southern Philippines as “the exercise carried over into a
long-term US support operation in Jolo”, which has reportedly expanded over
time.[34]
While the US troops have continued to play a non-combat role, some US military
personnel have been allowed to accompany AFP troops on their missions. On such
assignments, the armed US troops are allowed to defend themselves if attacked.[35]
However, reports concerning the number of US troops in the Philippines and the
nature of their engagement vary widely, with the presence of US forces in some
parts of the country only made public after their presence was accidentally
discovered.[36]
Regardless, the additional personnel, training and equipment from
the US certainly contributed to some of the successful operations against the
Abu Sayyaf, which weakened the group in some of its strongholds. Among the
successful operations of government troops were the killings of a number of
leading Abu Sayyaf members, including Khaddafy Janjalani in September 2006.
Yassar Igasan, a founding member of the group, succeeded him as leader of the
Abu Sayyaf in mid 2007.[37]
While the US is still the most significant country in terms of
foreign military engagement in the Philippines, Australia has also strengthened
its military relationship with the Philippines. Australia and the Philippines
signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in May 2007 after three years of
negotiation. SOFA is a reciprocal agreement which provides a new legal
framework to support Australian and Philippines troops engaged in military
cooperation activities in both countries. Under this agreement, new equipment
and training will be provided to the AFP and a significant number of Australian
military personnel can be deployed to the Philippines. The actual number of
visiting forces will be determined by the two countries and can vary
considerably between operations. Nontheless, Australia will only be the second
country to be allowed to send substantial numbers of military personnel to the
Philippines. However, like US military personnel in the Philippines, Australian
troops will be restricted to a non-combat role. Despite this restriction, SOFA
is a significant change in military cooperation between the two countries.[38]
While Australia and the Philippines have had military ties in the past,
collaboration has been limited to comparatively small-scale education and
training assistance and joint exercises, including annual bilateral
counter-terrorism training exercises.[39]
SOFA will therefore significantly strengthen military cooperation, with
President Arroyo expressing hopes that Australian assistance will
professionalise and modernise the AFP and improve the security situation in her
country. Australia will also benefit from the agreement, with Australia’s
assistant defence secretary Ben Coleman, for example, stressing the common
interest of the two countries in addressing the threat of terrorism in
Southeast Asia.[40]
However, SOFA still has to be ratified by the Philippine Senate before it will
come into force, with the Philippine Defence Department asking the senate to
swiftly ratify the agreement as recently as mid November 2007. Despite this
delay, talks have already begun regarding joint exercises in the southern
Philippines, and Australia has offered 30 river boats to support the fight
against the Abu Sayyaf and JI in the south of the country.[41]
Foreign military involvement: The way forward?
Since 9/11 the Philippine government has, once again, received
military assistance from foreign countries, particularly the US, for its
military campaign in the south. This assistance, which included the presence of
US military personnel in the southern Philippines, has not been welcomed by
all. Opponents have, for example, voiced concern about the sovereignty of the
Philippines. The deployment of US troops to the southern Philippines has also
triggered protests, with activists fearing that the US presence could aggravate
the volatile situation in the south rather than improve the living conditions
and security of the local population. Accusations of human rights abuses by the
AFP working with US forces and the raping of a Filipino woman by US soldiers
have added additional fuel to such protests.[42]
The proposed involvement of Australian troops has also already
caused concern and protests. Some activists have, for example, questioned the
motivation behind Australia’s proposed involvement in the southern Philippines,
accusing the Australian government of instigating SOFA to protect Australian
commercial interests in the Philippines. The interests of Australian mining
companies are of particular relevance here, with numerous Australian companies
already active in the Philippines. Furthermore, at the time SOFA was signed,
Arroyo had been meeting with representatives of the mining industry, including
executives of Melbourne-based BHP Billiton to discuss a multi-billion dollar
nickel project in Mindanao.[43]
Other critics of SOFA have voiced concern that the presence of
Australian troops will have an adverse impact upon security in the southern
Philippines. Indeed, it is questionable whether or not Australian military
involvement in the Philippines will help to solve the conflict. First of all,
the presence of Australian troops will support a military approach to the
conflict. Military force has, however, in the past decades failed to resolve
the conflict. At present, with negotiations between the MILF and the government
ongoing, increased national and foreign military presence may be particularly problematic.
MILF members have already criticised the presence of US troops in the southern
Philippines and will be unlikely to welcome Australians. Also, it remains
difficult for US (and also in the future Australian) military personnel to
distinguish between MILF and Abu Sayyaf fighters.[44]
Furthermore, military solutions in the southern Philippines have
not been successful because, throughout the last decades, the AFP has been
accused of human rights violations in the south and government operations have
led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. These operations
have therefore contributed to the suffering of the local population and have
undoubtedly increased local support for groups such as the MILF and the Abu
Sayyaf, which could not operate (or be as successful as they are) without
assistance from the local population. Also, direct links between the Abu Sayyaf
and corrupt members of the AFP reportedly exist, with guns and other military
equipment sold by AFP members to the Abu Sayyaf. Evidence of collusion between
AFP commanders and the Abu Sayyaf emerged, for example, in 2001. At the time,
the AFP had surrounded an Abu Sayyaf faction holding US and Filipino hostages.
Without apparent reason, some AFP units pulled out of the encirclement,
allowing the terrorists and their captives to escape. An investigation by the
government later concluded that “strong circumstantial evidence” exists that
AFP commanders had cooperated with the Abu Sayyaf.[45]
AFP operations have not only been controversial in the south of
the country. Indeed, the AFP has been accused of human rights abuses and the
killing of political activists in other parts of the Philippines. While one
objective of closer Australian-Philippine military cooperation is to
professionalise the AFP, it will be difficult to ensure that a better-equipped
and trained AFP will use their new equipment and skills in a responsible way
that respects the rights of the local population. Also, with AFP members
colluding with the Abu Sayyaf, it remains a concern that old and new military
equipment may find its way into the hands of the Abu Sayyaf.
Military support of the AFP may therefore not be the best way
forward. Other forms of assistance, such as aid for humanitarian, infrastructure
and other civilian projects may be more suitable. This is of importance because
some of the provinces and islands in the southern Philippines are among the
poorest in the country. Basilan, home of the Abu Sayyaf, is one example. More
than 50 per cent of the population of Basilan live just on or below the
poverty-line, the literacy rate is low, and social services hardly exist.[46]
While the Australian government is already contributing substantially in terms
of aid to the Philippines, an increase in such assistance rather than direct
military involvement may be more successful in solving the conflict in the
southern Philippines. Indeed, even if the Abu Sayyaf is financially or
ideologically supported by the al-Qaeda network or JI, it is crucial to
remember that it is the socio-economic problems of the southern Philippines
that have primarily contributed to the birth of the Abu Sayyaf. In fact, grave
issues of underdevelopment, which cut across national identities, still
encourage many young Muslim Filipinos to sympathise with or join the Abu Sayyaf
or similar organisations. Also, the developments of the last decades have
demonstrated that insufficient economic and humanitarian assistance and the
continuous use of military force to ‘pacify’ and integrate the south into the
main body of the Philippine nation-state, is unlikely to succeed,[47]
because, as MILF vice-chairman Ghazali Jafaar already clearly pointed out in
1995: “As long as Muslims continue to be oppressed, there will always be Abu
Sayyaf.”[48]
Information about the author
Carolin Liss is a PhD candidate at Murdoch University. (c.liss@murdoch.edu.au).
This paper is based on research conducted for her B.A. Honours thesis “The
Sipadan Kidnapping ‘Drama’ (April – September 2000). The Rise of the Abu
Sayyaf, International Terrorism, and the Global Media.” and her recently
submitted PhD thesis: Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh,
1992-2006: A Prismatic Interpretation of Security.
Other policy forums by Carolin Liss:
- The Challenges of Piracy in Southeast Asia and the Role of Australia, 25 October 2007, Austral Policy Forum 07-19A
- The roots of piracy in Southeast Asia, 22 October 2007, Austral Policy Forum 07-18A
Endnotes
[1] W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism. The Moros
of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 12. Efforts were also made by Muslims to
solve their problems and maintain their identity by peaceful means. See:
Macapado Abaton Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The
Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative, Marawi City: Mindanao State University,
1994. Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels. Everyday Politics and Armed
Separatism in the Southern Philippines, Berkley: University of California
Press, 1998, pp. 197-233. On Moro identity see Charles O. Frake; ‘The Genesis
of Kinds of People in the Sulu Archipelago’, in: Anwar S. Dil (ed); `Language
and Cultural Description. Essays by Charles O. Fraké, Stanford, California
1980, pp. 314-315. Rad D. Silva; `Two Hills of the same Land́, Mindanao-Sulu,
Critical Studies & Research Group, 1979, p.31. James Francis Warren; `Moró,
in: Ainslie T. Embree (ed); `Encyclopaedia of Asian Historý, Volume 3, New York
1988, p.39 .
[2] Other factors include political developments in
the Philippines, such as the declaration of martial law by President
Marcos.
[3] Nur Misuari, quoted in Man, p. 87. The argument
against oppression and exploitation was not only aimed at the Philippine
government, but also against the US, whose involvement in the Philippines was
seen as neo-colonial and imperialistic.
[5] Anthony Davis, ‘Evolution in the Philippine
war’ Jane´s Intelligence Review, July 2000, p. 29. Rainer Werning,
‘Viel Widerstand, wenig Anpassung’, Südostasien, Jg.16, Nr.3, September
2000, p. 70.
[6] Rainer Werning, US-Imperialismus auf den
Philippinen. Der Mindanao Konflikt, Muenster: Wurf Verlag, 1983, pp. 89-91.
[7] Lela Garner Noble, ‘The Moro National
Liberation Front in the Philippines’, Pacific Affairs 49, no. 3, Fall
1976, pp. 412-18.
[8] David Wurfel, ‘The Philippines: Collateral
Damage in the War on Terrorism? Domestic and International Realities’, CANCAPS
Bulletin du CONCSAP, no. 33, Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, May
2002, p. 2.
[9] Larry Niksch, ‘Abu Sayyaf: Target of
Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation’, CRS Report for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, Updated 24 January 2007, p. 2.
[10] Christos Iacovou, ‘From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf: The
Radicalization of Islam in the Philippines’, 11 July 2000,
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=116, accessed 24
January 2001. Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent
Moon, Quezon City: Ateneo Centre for Social Policy and Public Affairs,
Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000, p. 211.
[12] It remains difficult to establish the
approximate number of persons who belong to the group. Estimates vary widely,
from around one hundred to one thousand armed men. Some observers believe the
Abu Sayyaf swelled from an initial band of twenty to a group of 600 between
1992 and 1998, before rapidly declining to about 200 members. However, it seems
possible that the Abu Sayyaf has never numbered more than 300 armed men.
Nonetheless, in addition to the fighting core the group has an unknown number
of active civilian supporters alleged to engage in recruiting, training and
other non-combat activities, as well as an unascertained number of
local-regional sympathisers. Mark Turner, ‘Terrorism and Secession in the
Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 17, no. 1, June 1995, p.15. ‘A Past Traced in Terror – Abu Sayyaf´s
short but violent history’, part of: `The Koenighsa Assignment. (ASG)-(Part
2)’, The Global Spy Magazine, 2001,
http://www.spynews.net/AbuSayyafGroup-2.html, accessed 21 April 2001.
[14] ‘Bearer of the Sword. The Abu Sayyaf has
nebulous beginnings and incoherent aims, Part of: The Koenighsa Assignment.
(ASG)-(Part 2)’, The Global Spy Magazine, 2001,
http://www.spynews.net/AbuSayyafGroup-2.html, accessed 21 April
2001.
[15] Haikal Mohamed Isa, ‘Govt Negotiators Pocketed
Ransom Money, Abu Sayyaf Claims’, Bernama, http://global.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=9907845…Fmt=3&Sid=4&Idx=26&Deli=1&RQT=309&Dtp=1,
accessed 25 May 2001. ‘Military Sees Diminished Threat from Extremist Group’, Businessworld
Manila, 7 May 1999, http://global.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=9907885…mt=3&Sid=5&Idx=387&Deli=1&RQT=309&Dtp=1,
accessed 25 May 2001. See also: Rommel Banlaoi, ‘Leadership Dynamics in
Terrorist Organisations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case’, Paper
presented at International Symposium: The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist
Threats in Southeast Asia, 2005.
[18] Ronald J. May, `Muslim Mindanao. Four Years
after the Peace Agreement´, Southeast Asian Affairs 2001, Singapore
2001, p. 270. Observers believe that more than 600 civilians were killed and
237,000 Muslims and Christians were displaced in the MILF-AFP conflict until
the end of May alone, when the conflict once again intensified.
[19] Julie Alipala-Inot; `Treated Well, Say
Vigilantes´, part of: `The Koenigha Assignment. Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG)´, http://www.spynews.net/AbuSayyafGroup-1.htm,
accessed 26 April 2001; `Abu Rejects Aventajado as Hostage Negotiator´, part
of: `The Koenigha Assignment. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)´,
http://www.spynews.net/AbuSayyafGroup-1.htm, accessed 26 april 2001.
[20] The demands changed over time. In June it was
reported that the Abu Sayyaf demanded that public schools in Sulu hire more
Muslim teachers, the compulsory wearing of veils by Muslim students in Sulu, as
well as a cessation of Christmas parties and proms in public schools. See:
Hadja Amy Malbun, `They Express Conditions for
Freeing Basilan Hostages´,
http://global.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=9907870…mt=3&Sid=5&Idx=254&Deli=1&RQT=309&Dtp=1,
Businessworld, Manila, June 27, 2000, accessed 25 May 2001.
[21] `Trouble in Paradise´, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/hostage/storydb/f3.html
accessed 04/26/01. `Philippine Troops Press Attack on Rebels, Defying Threats
to Kill Hostages´, New York Times, April 24, 2000, http://global.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=9907883…mt=3&Sid=5&Idx=368&Deli=1&RQT=309&Dtp=1
accessed 25 May 2001. `Filipino Army Attacks Rebels Holding Hostages´, New
York Times, April 23, 2000, http://global.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=9907883…mt=3&Sid=5&Idx=369&Deli=1&RQT=309&Dtp=1
accessed 25 May 2001.
[23] `Auch Reporter gerieten in Gefangenschaft´, Spiegel
Online, 2 Juni 2000, accessed 24 January 2001.
[25] `Killing Fields´, Spiegel, 5. September
2000, accessed 12 March 2001. Andreas Bänziger, `Macht durch Lösegeld´, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 11. September 2000, p. 2. `Faszination des Terrors´, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 23. April 2001, p. 9
[26] Alex Perry, `Crossfire. A Bloodbath Erupts in
the Philippines after Muslim Kidnappers Try Once Too Often´, Time, June
11, 2001, pp. 28-30; `No More Ransoms. Kidnapping in the Philippines´, Economist,
2 June 2001, http://web1.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/…yn=10!xrn_38_0_A75175670?sw_aep=murdoc
accessed 28 June 2001.
[31] Kit Collier and Malcolm Cook, ‘The Philippines’ Sanctuaries of
Terror‘, Project Syndicate, 2006, accessed 10 August 2006.
[37] ‘Testing Confirms Abu Sayyaf Death‘, BBC News, 20
January 2007, accessed 20 June 2007. ‘New Abu Sayyaf Leader “Is Islamic
Scholar”‘, CNN, 27 June 2007, accessed 28 June 2007.
[38] Michael Lim Ubac, ‘RP, Australia Sign Security
Agreement’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 June 2007. Sandra O’Malley,
‘Fed: Aust Boosts Counter-terror Assistance to the Philippines’, Australian
Associated Press General News, 31 May 2007.
[39] Australian Government Department of Defence, ‘Annual Report 2003-04. Defence
Cooperation. Southeast Asia. Performance Summary’, accessed 26
October 2007.
[41] ‘Defense Chief Urges Ratification
of SOFA with Australia‘, GMANews, 11 November 2007, accessed
23 November 2007. Emma-Kate Symons, ‘Diggers to Target Filipino Terror’, Australian,
29 January 2007.
[42] Niksch, p. 16. ‘Basilan Residents Protest US
Military Presence‘, Kyodo News International, 6 February 2002,
accessed 15 November 2007.
[46] Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon,
p. 207. Turner, ‘Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines’, p. 13.
For more general information see: ‘The Philippine Province of Basilan’, http://www.philippine.org/01prov/basilan.html
accessed 5 April 2001.
[47] There are various suggestions to solve the
conflict peacefully. A remarkable number of them suggest that a federal system
be implemented.
[48] Rigoberto Tiglao; `To Fight or Not To Fight´, Far
Eastern Economic Review, vol 158, no 10, March 9, 1995, p. 21
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